proved a hardness versus randomness tradeoff for BPP in the uniform setting, which was subsequently extended to give optimal tradeoffs for the full range of possible hardness assumptions (in slightly weaker settings). Gutfreund, Shaltiel, and Ta-Shma [Comput. Complexity, 12 (2003), pp. 85-130] proved a uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoff for AM, but that result worked only on the "high end" of possible hardness assumptions. In this work, we give uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for AM that are near-optimal for the full range of possible hardness assumptions. Following Gutfreund, Shaltiel, and Ta-Shma, we do this by constructing a hitting-set-generator (HSG) for AM with "resilient reconstruction." Our construction is a recursive variant of the MiltersenVinodchandran HSG [Comput. Complexity, 14 (2005), pp. 256-279], the only known HSG construction with this required property. The main new idea is to have the reconstruction procedure operate implicitly and locally on superpolynomially large objects, using tools from PCPs (low-degree testing, self-correction) together with a novel use of extractors that are built from Reed-Muller codes for a sort of locally computable error-reduction. As a consequence we obtain gap theorems for AM (and AM ∩ coAM) that state, roughly, that either AM (or AM ∩ coAM) protocols running in time t(n) can simulate all of EXP ("Arthur-Merlin games are powerful") or else all of AM (or AM ∩ coAM) can be simulated in nondeterministic time s(n) ("Arthur-Merlin games can be derandomized") for a near-optimal relationship between t(n) and s(n). As in Gutfreund, Shatiel, and Ta-Shma, the case of AM ∩ coAM yields a particularly clean theorem that is of special interest due to the wide array of cryptographic and other problems that lie in this class.
that certain hard functions exist, thus circumventing the need for proving circuit lower bounds. More precisely, we will work with hardness assumptions concerning the circuit complexity of functions computable in exponential time.
1 Derandomizing BPP can be done with lower bounds against size s( ) deterministic circuits, while derandomizing AM typically requires lower bounds against size s( ) nondeterministic circuits, where is the input length of the hard function. Naturally, stronger assumptions-higher values of s( )-give stronger conclusions, i.e., more efficient derandomization. There are two extremes of this range of tradeoffs: In the "high end" of hardness assumptions one assumes hardness against circuits of very large size s( ) = 2 Ω( ) and can obtain "full derandomization," i.e., BPP = P [19] or AM = NP [27] . However, the "low end" one assumes hardness against smaller circuits of size s( ) = poly( ) and can conclude "weak derandomization," i.e., simulations of BPP (resp., AM) that run in subexponential deterministic (resp., nondeterministic subexponential) time [6, 30] . Today, after a long line of research [28, 6, 16, 19, 3, 23, 27, 18, 30, 34, 29, 35] we have optimal hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for both BPP and AM that achieve "optimal parameters" in the nonuniform setting (see the discussion of nonuniform versus uniform below).
Pseudorandom generators and hitting set generators.
The known hardness versus randomness tradeoffs are all achieved by constructing a pseudorandom generator (PRG). This is a deterministic function G which, on input m, produces a small set of T m-bit strings in time poly(T ), with the property that a randomly chosen string from this set cannot be efficiently distinguished from a uniformly chosen mbit string. 2 In this paper we are interested in a weaker variant of a pseudorandom generator called a hitting-set-generator (HSG). A function G is an HSG against a family of circuits on m variables if any circuit in the family which accepts at least 1/3 of its inputs also accepts one of the m-bit output strings of G (when run with input m). It is standard that given an HSG against deterministic (resp., co-nondeterministic) circuits of size poly(m) one can derandomize RP (resp., AM) in time poly(T ) by simulating the algorithm (resp., protocol) on all strings output by the HSG, and accepting if at least one of the runs accepts. It is also known that HSGs against deterministic circuits suffice to derandomize two-sided error (BPP) [1, 2] .
The proofs of the aforementioned hardness versus randomness tradeoffs are all composed of two parts: first, they give an efficient way to generate a set of strings (the output of the PRG or HSG) when given access to some function f . Second, they give a reduction showing that if the intended derandomization using this set of strings fails, then the function f can be computed by a small circuit, which then contradicts the initial hardness assumption when taking f to be the characteristic function of an EXP-complete problem. We now focus on the reduction part. An easy first step is that an input x (to the randomized algorithm or AM protocol) on which the intended derandomization fails gives rise to a small circuit D x that "catches" the generator; i.e., D x accepts at least 1/3 of its inputs but none of the strings in the generator output. (The obtained circuit D x is a deterministic circuit when attempting to derandomize BPP and a co-nondeterministic circuit when attempting to derandomize AM.) The main part of all the proofs is to then give a reduction that transforms this circuit D x into a small circuit C that computes f .
Uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs.
All the aforementioned hardness versus randomness tradeoffs are nonuniform tradeoffs because the reduction in the proof is nonuniform: given D x it shows only the existence of a small circuit C that computes f but does not give an efficient uniform procedure to produce it. (In other words, the reduction relies on nonuniform advice when transforming D x into C.) We remark that all the aforementioned results are "fully black-box" (meaning that they do not use any properties of the hard function f or circuit D x ), and it was shown in [33] that any hardness versus randomness tradeoff that is "fully black-box" cannot have a uniform reduction.
A non-black-box uniform reduction for derandomizing BPP in the low end was given in [20] . This reduction gives a uniform randomized poly-time algorithm (sometimes called a reconstruction algorithm) for transforming a circuit D x that catches the generator into a circuit C that computes the function f . It follows that if the intended derandomization fails, and if, furthermore, one can feasibly generate an input x on which it fails (by a uniform computation), then one can use the uniform reduction to construct the circuit C in probabilistic polynomial time, which in turn implies that f is computable in BPP. (This should be compared to the nonuniform setting in which one would get that f is in P/poly.) An attractive feature of this result is that it can be interpreted as a (low-end) gap theorem for BPP that asserts the following: Either randomized algorithms are somewhat weak (in the sense that they can be simulated deterministically in subexponential time on feasibly generated inputs) or else they are very strong (in the sense that they can compute any function in EXP). 3 Obtaining a high-end version of this result is still open. In [33] it was shown how to get a high-end tradeoff in the slightly weaker setting where the hard function f is computable in polynomial space rather than exponential time.
Uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for AM.
A nonblack-box uniform reduction for derandomizing AM in the high end was given in [15] . It yields gap theorems for both AM and AM ∩ coAM. The gap theorem for AM is analogous to that of [20] (except that it concerns the high end and not the low end); it asserts that either Arthur-Merlin protocols are very weak (in the sense that they can be simulated nondeterministically in polynomial time on feasibly generated inputs) or else they are somewhat strong (in the sense that they can simulate E = DTIME(2 O( ) ) in time 2 o( ) ). The gap theorem for AM ∩ coAM gives the same result with "AM" replaced by "AM ∩ coAM." The statement is, in fact, cleaner for AM ∩ coAM because it does not mention feasibly generated inputs and instead applies to all inputs.
The result of [15] relies on identifying a certain "resiliency property" of an HSG construction of [27] (constructed for the nonuniform setting) and on "instance checking" [9] , which was previously used in this context in [5, 6, 33] . While it gives a high-end result, it does not generalize to the low end because the HSG construction of [27] works only in the high end. We remark that there is an alternative construction (in the nonuniform setting) of [30] that does work in the low end but does not have the crucial resiliency property.
Our result:
Low-end uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for AM. In this paper we obtain a resilient HSG (with a uniform reduction proving its correctness) that works over a larger domain of parameters and covers a wide range of hardness assumptions (coming very close to the absolute low end). Using our result we extend the gap theorems of [15] as follows (for a formal statement of the two theorems below see Theorems 6 and 7 in section 2).
Theorem (informal) 1 . Either E = DTIME (2 O( ) ) is computable by ArthurMerlin protocols with time s( ) or for any AM language L there is a nondeterministic machine M that runs in time exponential in and solves L correctly on feasibly generated inputs of length n = s( ) Θ(1/(log −log log s( ))
2 ) .
The following theorem achieves a clean statement that works for all inputs (rather than feasibly generated inputs). However, this is achieved only for AM ∩ coAM.
Theorem (informal) 2. Either E = DTIME(2 O( ) ) is computable by ArthurMerlin protocols with time s( ) or for any AM ∩ coAM language L there is a nondeterministic (and co-nondeterministic) machine M that runs in time exponential in and solves L correctly on all inputs of length n = s( )
Θ(1/(log −log log s( )) 2 ) .
Note that in the two theorems above we use a nonstandard way of measuring the running time of the machine M . This is because it is not possible to express the running time of M as a function of its input length in a closed form that covers all the possible choices of s( ). It may be helpful to view the consequences for some particular choices of s( ) and then express the running time of the nondeterministic machine as a function of the length of its input.
(i) For s( ) = 2 Ω( ) (the high end) the nondeterministic machine runs in polynomial time in the length of its input. This is exactly the same behavior as in [15] . Thus, our results truly extend [15] . We comment that the techniques of [15] do not work when s(
δ and constant δ > 0, the nondeterministic machine runs in
O(log a ) and constant a > 3, the nondeterministic machine runs in time subexponential in the length of its input. The a > 3 requirement is suboptimal as we can hope to get the same behavior even when a ≥ 1 (which is the absolute low end).
A discussion regarding the best possible parameters that can be expected in hardness versus randomness tradeoffs appears in [18] . Our results are suboptimal in the sense that one could hope to get n = s( ) Ω(1) whereas we get only n = s( )
2 ) . Note that this is indeed optimal in the high end, where s( ) = 2 Ω( ) . However, it becomes suboptimal when s( ) is smaller. Another effect of this problem is that while we can hope for hardness versus randomness tradeoffs that start working as soon as s( ) = 2 ω(log ) (the "absolute low end"), our results start working only when s( ) > 2 (log )
3 .
Our techniques.
The source of our improvement over [15] is that we replace the HSG of [27] (that works only in the high end) with a new construction of a generator. The new generator and its proof of correctness build on the previous construction of [27] while introducing several new ideas. We give a detailed informal overview of the ingredients and ideas that come up in our construction in section 5.1.
On a very high level we can identify three new ideas in our construction. First, we use techniques from PCPs (low-degree testing and self-correction) to speed up certain steps in the reduction establishing the correctness of [27] so that they run in sublinear time in the size of their input. Although it has long been observed that there is some similarity between aspects of PCP constructions and aspects of PRG and HSG constructions, this seems to be the first time primitives like low-degree testing have proven useful in such constructions. Second, we run both the construction of [27] and the associated reduction recursively, in a manner reminiscent of [18, 35] (although the low-level details are different). Finally, we introduce a new primitive called local extractors for Reed-Muller codes, which are extractors that are computable in sublinear time when run on inputs that are guaranteed to be ReedMuller codewords. A construction of such an object can be deduced from [30] . They play a crucial role in the improved constructions and may be of interest in their own right. In section 5.1 we give a detailed informal account of our construction and the way the new ideas fit into the proof.
Motivation.
Uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs represent some of the most involved proofs of nontrivial relationships amongst complexity classes, using "current technology." Pushing them to their limits gives new results but also may expose useful new techniques, as we believe this work does. Moreover, the complexity classes we study, AM and AM ∩ coAM, contain a rich array of important problems, from hard problems upon which cryptographic primitives are built to group-theoretic problems, to graph isomorphism, and indeed all of the class SZK (statistical zero knowledge).
A second motivation is the quest for unconditional derandomization results. In [15] it was shown that if one can prove a low-end gap theorem for AM that works for all inputs rather than just feasibly generated inputs, then it follows that AM can be derandomized (in a weak sense) unconditionally (the precise details appear in [15] ). In this paper we come closer to achieving this goal by achieving a low-end version of [15] .
Organization of the paper.
In section 2 we restate our main theorems formally using precise notation. In section 3 we describe some ingredients that we use as well as the new "local extractors." In section 4 we define some new variants of AM protocols that we will use as subprotocols in the final result. In section 5 we give the new recursive HSG and an important ingredient that will be used in the proof. In section 6 we state and prove the main technical theorem. In section 7 we derive our main results from the main technical theorem.
Formal statement of results.
In this section we formally state Theorems 1 and 2. In order to do so we need to precisely define the notion of "derandomization on feasibly generated inputs." 2.1. Feasibly generated inputs. Following [15] , we will use the notions defined in [21] . Loosely speaking, we say that two languages L, M are indistinguishable if it is hard to feasibly generate inputs on which they disagree. For this paper it makes sense to allow the procedure trying to come up with such inputs (which is called a refuter in the terminology of [21] ) to use nondeterminism. We first need the following definition.
Definition 3. Let L 1 , L 2 be two languages and let x be a string. We say that
We now define the notion of a refuter, which is a machine attempting to distinguish between two languages.
Definition 4 (distinguishability of languages). We say that a nondeterministic machine R (the refuter) distinguishes between two languages L 1 , L 2 ⊆ {0, 1}
* on input length n if on every one of its accepting computation paths R(1 n ) outputs some x of length n on which L 1 and L 2 disagree.
With this notation we can formally capture the informal statements in the introduction. More specifically, when given a language L ∈ AM, a nondeterministic machine M running in time t(n) < 2 n succeeds on feasibly generated inputs if for any refuter R running in time t(n), R does not distinguish L from L(M ). 
2 ) (resp.,
2 ) ) such that for any refuter R running in time s( ) when producing strings of length n there are infinitely many input lengths n on which
We remark that the hidden constants in the statement above depend on the language L. The following theorem is the formal restatement of Theorem 2.
Theorem 7. There exists a language A complete for E (resp., EXP) such that for every time-constructible function < s( ) < 2 either
2 ) ) such there are infinitely many input lengths n on which
Following [15] , we can also reverse the order of "infinitely often" in Theorem 7 and achieve the following theorem. 
Preliminaries.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the definition of AM and other standard complexity definitions (see, e.g., [13] ). We remark that by [14, 7, 12] we can assume that AM is defined by an Arthur-Merlin protocol with public coins, two rounds, and perfect completeness. In this paper we also refer to protocols "that run in time s( ) on inputs of length ," by which we mean that the total length of messages sent during the protocol and the time of Arthur's final computation is bounded by s( ).
3.1. Nondeterministic and co-nondeterministic circuits. We will be working with nondeterministic and co-nondeterministic circuits. A nondeterministic circuit is an ordinary Boolean circuit C with two sets of inputs, x and y. We say that C accepts input x if ∃y C(x, y) = 1 and that C rejects input x otherwise. We refer to a string y on which C(x, y) = 1 as a witness showing that C accepts x. A conondeterministic circuit has the opposite acceptance criterion: it accepts input x if for all y C(x, y) = 1 and rejects input x otherwise. We refer to a string y on which C(x, y) = 0 as a witness that C rejects x.
3.2. Low-degree testing and self-correctors. The key to our results is that in many places we work implicitly with functions that are supposed to be low-degree polynomials-of course this is the central concept in PCPs as well. Just as with PCPs, we need the ability to locally test whether an implicitly supplied function is of the "correct" form: namely, we need to check whether it is (close to) a low-degree polynomial. As is standard, once we have determined that an implicitly supplied function is close to a low-degree one, we can "access" the nearby low-degree function locally using a self-corrector.
Low-degree testers and self-correctors are standard primitives in the PCP literature. In fact, for our intended use of these primitives, we do not need delicate control of the parameters; we need only to be able to operate on d-variate functions over a field F in time poly(|F|, d) (hence making at most that many queries), while handling constant relative distance, and with constant soundness error for both primitives. The formal definitions and the known results that we will make use of follow.
Definition 9 (low-degree tester). A low-degree tester with parameters h, δ, is a probabilistic oracle machine M that has oracle access to a function f : F d → F, and for which
f accepts with probability 1, and
f rejects with probability at least δ.
Lemma 10 (see [11] 
Lemma 12 (see [8, 24] ). There exists a (nonadaptive) self-corrector with param-
We remark that for both low-degree testers and self-correctors, it is possible to decrease the soundness error from a constant to 2 −t by repeating the protocol Θ(t) times.
Local extractors for subsets.
Another object we will use to perform local computations on an implicitly supplied function is what we call a "local extractor for subsets." The notion of "locally computable extractors" was introduced in [25, 36] in the context of encryption in the bounded-storage model. Loosely speaking, it requires that the extractor is computable in time sublinear in the length of its first input. In our construction we require such extractors for very low "entropy thresholds." However, Vadhan [36] proved that it is impossible to have such extractors unless the entropy threshold is very high. For this purpose we introduce a new variant of local extractors in which the first input comes from some prescribed subset (rather than the set {0, 1} n ) and exploit the fact that we intend to run the extractor on inputs that are codewords in an error-correcting code. It turns out that the construction of [30] can be computed in time polynomial in the output when applied on the Reed-Muller code, even when shooting for low-entropy thresholds. The formal details follow.
Definition 13 (local extractor for subsets). 
We will use local extractors in the following way. We will be interested in the set
and we would like to be able to check whether some x ∈ C is in this set by performing a local computation on x. This is not possible in general, but a relaxation of this goal is. If we perform the probabilistic test of checking whether E x (y) ∈ D for a random y, then we will accept all x in the set, and not accept too many other x, because by the above proposition, the set of x ∈ C on which this test accepts with high probability is "small"-it has size at most 2 k . This relaxation will turn out to be sufficient for our intended application.
The GST framework.
In this section we describe the approach of [15] for obtaining uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for AM and formalize two key ingredients, commit-and-evaluate protocols (which we define for the first time in this paper) and instance checkers (which have been defined in previous works).
As described in the introduction, our goal is to produce, from a hard function f , an HSG against nondeterministic circuits (and thus suitable for derandomizing AM) for which the associated reduction (showing how to compute f efficiently if the HSG fails) possesses an additional resiliency property. Here the resiliency property means that the reduction can be cast as two phases of interaction between Arthur and Merlin: in the first phase, Merlin commits (with high probability) to a function g, and in the second phase, Merlin reveals evaluations of g upon Arthur's request.
We formalize this two-phase protocol as a commit-and-evaluate protocol in the next subsection; the key properties it should possess are the aforementioned resiliency, meaning that Merlin is indeed committed to answering all future evaluation queries according to some function g after the commit phase, and conformity with f , which means that the honest Merlin can commit to the "true" hard function f . In section 4.2, we define instance checkers, which will be used to convert a commit-and-evaluate protocol that conforms resiliently with f into a true Arthur-Merlin protocol for f , assuming f is an E-or EXP-complete function.
Overall, we end up with a framework for obtaining uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for AM; the missing ingredient is an HSG whose associated reduction has the required resiliency property (i.e., can be formulated as a commit-andevaluate protocol). This we construct in section 5.
Commit-and-evaluate protocols.
Let us start with some notation. An i round AM protocol is a protocol in which Arthur and Merlin receive a common input x and at each round Arthur sends public random coins and Merlin replies. At the end of the protocol Arthur outputs a value (not necessarily Boolean), denoted by out(π, M, x), that is a random variable defined relative to a strategy M for Merlin; i.e., M is a function that describes Merlin's response given a history of the interaction so far. The value out(π, M, x) is a random variable because Arthur flips coins during the protocol. The running time of the protocol is the running time of Arthur. A protocol may take an auxiliary common input y, which we will variously think of as a "commitment" or an "advice string." In this case we denote the output by out(π, M, x, y). The output ⊥ (which is intended to be output by Arthur when he detects a dishonest Merlin) is a distinguished symbol disjoint from the set of intended output values.
With this notation we can define the notion of AM protocols that output values.
Definition 17 (AM protocols that output values). Given an AM protocol π and an input domain I, we say that π with auxiliary input y (i) is partially single valued (PSV) over I with soundness error s if there exists a function g defined over I such that for all x ∈ I and all Merlin strategies
(ii) conforms with a function f defined over I with completeness c if for all x ∈ I there exists a Merlin strategy M for which We may sometimes omit s and c, in which case they are fixed to their default values s = 1/3 and c = 2/3. We also omit I when it is clear from the context.
Note that a polynomial time AM protocol of the above type computes the characteristic function of some language L if and only if L ∈ AM ∩ coAM. We will be interested in protocols that are composed of two phases and operate over the domain I = {0, 1}
n . The first phase is called the commit phase. This is an AM protocol whose input is 1 n and whose auxiliary input is an advice string α that depends only on n. The role of this phase is to generate an auxiliary input to the second phase. The second phase is called the evaluation phase. This is an AM protocol whose input is x ∈ I and whose auxiliary input is the output of the commit phase protocol. The reason we distinguish between two different phases is that we make the additional requirement that there is a function computed by the combined protocol and that this function is completely determined at the end of the commit phase (that is before Merlin knows the input x). The exact details appear below.
Definition 18 (commit-and-evaluate protocols). A commit-and-evaluate protocol is a pair of AM protocols π = (π commit , π eval ). Given π and an input domain
n , we say that π with advice α (i) conforms with a function f defined over I if there exists a Merlin strategy M commit for which
runs in time t(n) for some function t if both π commit and π eval run in time bounded by t(n).
We may sometimes omit γ, in which case it is fixed to its default value γ = 2/3. We argue that completeness, soundness, and resiliency of a commit-and-evaluate protocol can be amplified from their default values by parallel repetition. Proof. The new commitment protocol π commit simply runs the old commitment protocol π commit t = Θ(t) times in parallel, producing commitments (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u t ). Note that the Merlin strategy M commit that executes the honest M commit strategy for each repetition results in every u i being a commitment for which π eval with auxiliary 6 In the next proposition we claim amplification only for protocols where the commit protocol has two rounds and the evaluation protocol has perfect completeness. We make these relaxations because all protocols constructed in this paper have these properties. However, a more careful argument can get the same conclusion without these two assumptions. This follows along the same lines that parallel repetition of multiround AM protocols amplifies soundness (see, for example, [13, p. 145-148] ).
input u i conforms with f with completeness 1. The new evaluation protocol π eval runs, for each i, the old evaluation protocol π eval t = Θ(t) times in parallel with u i as auxiliary input. If for all commitments u i all the repetitions of π eval with advice u i output the same value v, then π eval outputs v, and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Note that by the perfect completeness of π eval if Merlin executes the "honest" M eval strategy on each of the repetitions using advice u i , the resulting strategy causes Arthur to output f (x) with probability one. Thus, π conforms with f .
For resiliency, note that, as π commit is a two round protocol, then with probability at least 2/3 over Arthur's choice of coins, every possible reply of Merlin results in a "good" commitment u (i.e., one for which π eval is PSV). It follows that when making t invocations of π commit , with probability at least 1 − 2 −t there exists an i * on which Arthur sends coin tosses for which every possible reply of Merlin leads to a "good" commitment u i * . We claim that whenever this event happens the protocol π eval is PSV when using advice u 1 , . . . , u t , which establishes the claimed resiliency.
We have that for u i * there exists a function g such that for any Merlin strategy
It is folklore (see, e.g., [13, pp. 145-148] ) that parallel repetition of (multiround) AM protocols reduces the soundness error exponentially. Therefore, as π eval runs π eval t times with the commitment u i * , it follows that any strategy of Merlin in π eval has a probability at most 2 −t of outputting a value that is not in {g(x), ⊥} in all t repetitions of π eval with commitment u i * . In particular, no Merlin strategy for π eval can make Arthur output a value different than g(x) with probability larger than 2 −t , which is the claimed soundness error.
Usefulness of commit-and-evaluate protocols.
Note that after running the commitment protocol π commit it is possible to run the evaluation protocol π eval (with the auxiliary input that is output by π commit ) many times on many different inputs in I. We will typically perform these invocations of π eval in parallel, and after suitably amplifying soundness (via Proposition 19), we can be sure that all evaluations agree with the committed-to function (with high probability). Note also that a γ-resilient commit-and-evaluate protocol that conforms with f does not necessarily "compute" f in any meaningful way. This is because in the commit phase, Merlin may not cooperate, causing the evaluation phase to receive an auxiliary input leading it to compute a function different from f . However, Merlin cannot choose this function in a way that depends on the input to the evaluation protocol.
On a more technical level, commit-and-evaluate protocols are useful because the commit phase can be executed before the input x is revealed, and following the commit phase it is guaranteed that Merlin is committed to some function f . This allows Arthur to make "local tests" on the function f . For concreteness let us demonstrate this approach on low-degree testing (that is, testing whether f is close to a low-degree polynomial). Consider the following protocol: Arthur and Merlin play the commit phase of the protocol (which determines a function f ). Then Arthur sends randomness for a low-degree test which in turn determines queries x 1 , . . . , x m to f . On each one of the queries x i , Arthur and Merlin play the evaluation protocol (in parallel) and in the end Arthur checks that the low-degree test passes with the obtained evaluations. Note that no matter how Merlin plays he cannot make Arthur accept a function f that is far from a low-degree polynomial. If Merlin were not required to commit to a function f in advance, he could answer queries arbitrarily, passing the low-degree test and then answering other queries (for example) in a manner inconsistent with any low-degree function.
Instance checkers.
Following [15] , it is possible to transform an AM protocol that conforms resiliently with an E-complete or EXP-complete function into one that computes the function. This is done by evaluating the function via an instance checker (defined below) following the commit phase. Thus to construct a (standard) AM protocol for languages in E or EXP it is sufficient to construct commit-andevaluate protocols that conform resiliently with a complete problem.
Instance checkers were introduced in [9] . These are probabilistic oracle machines that are able to "check" that the oracle is some prescribed function in the sense that when given an "incorrect" oracle the machine will either fail or compute the prescribed function.
Definition 20 (instance checker). Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a function. An instance checker IC for f with soundness error δ is a probabilistic oracle machine for which
, and (ii) for every function g = f and every x ∈ {0, 1} * ,
We say that an instance checker IC makes queries of length v( ) on inputs of length if for every input x ∈ {0, 1} and for every oracle g all the queries made by IC to its oracle are for strings of length v( ).
Note that by repeating the execution Θ(t) times the soundness error of instance checkers can be reduced from a constant to 2 −t . In this paper we use the fact that languages complete for EXP and E have instance checkers. This was achieved by a sequence of works [26, 31, 5, 4] . The reader is referred to [33] 
ii) There is a language in E that is complete for E under linear time reductions, and its characteristic function f has a polynomial-time instance checker that makes queries of length v( ) = O( ), where is the input length.

A recursive HSG construction.
In this section we present a recursive version of the Miltersen-Vinodchandran (MV) generator [27] that receives a polynomial p (which should be thought of as the encoding of a hard function f ) and outputs a multiset of m-bit strings.
Overview of the construction and proof.
We start by describing the original MV generator using some of our language and highlighting the parts that we modify to obtain improvements. The reader may skip to the formal, self-contained presentation of the new construction in section 5.2 if they wish. Throughout this section, F is the field with q elements.
The original MV generator. Given a polynomial p : F
d → F of degree h, the original MV generator chooses q and m to be slightly larger than h and (the standard choice is, say, m = q = 2h). For every axis-parallel line L in
Given a co-nondeterministic circuit D such that D rejects every output of the generator, we would like to show that there is a commit-and-evaluate protocol π that receives D as advice and conforms with p resiliently. We need to make the additional assumption that D rejects very few, say, 2 m δ , strings of length m overall.
In the context of AM derandomization this can be achieved by amplifying the AM protocol we are attempting to derandomize using dispersers. We stress, as this will be important later on, that this amplification can only achieve a constant 0 < δ < 1 efficiently.
We now describe the commit-and-evaluate protocol for evaluating p. In the commit phase Arthur sends a uniformly chosen set S ⊆ F of size v ≈ h δ and Merlin replies with a list of values for every point in S d that are supposed to be the "correct" set of values-the restriction of p to S d . In the evaluation phase the two parties are given a point x ∈ F d and Arthur wants to evaluate p(x). Arthur and Merlin first compute a "path" to x: a sequence of axis-parallel lines starting with lines passing through S Consistency test. Arthur performs a "consistency test" using the polynomials g L sent by Merlin. This consists of checking that for every pair of lines L 1 and L 2 that intersect at a point, the values of g L1 and g L2 agree at that point.
If both the tests pass, then Arthur selects the single line L in the path that intersects x and decides that p(x) equals the value of g L at that intersection, outputting that value.
We describe why this protocol conforms resiliently with p. An honest Merlin can indeed conform to p by following the protocol. A cheating Merlin has the freedom to choose values for the points in S d that are incorrect and in this case the evaluation protocol does not necessarily conform with p. However, the evaluation protocol is (with high probability over the choice of S) PSV by a key property of the consistency test: it is shown in [27] that there is at most one collection of functions from the small set Z = {z : D rejects z} that passes the consistency test. This means that once Merlin commits to values for the points in S d he cannot make Arthur output two different values on a given input x.
We stress that this key argument in [27] uses the structure of polynomials in a very weak way. The argument uses only that each g L sent by Merlin is a set of m > h evaluations of a degree h univariate polynomial, and so it is a codeword of a ReedSolomon code. In our construction we will use a relaxed notion of "lines" for which p restricted to such a "line" is still a codeword of an error-correcting code, which suffices for this argument. The precise definition of this relaxed "line" is in Definition 22.
We now turn our attention to the running time of the protocol. There are roughly v d lines on the "path" to x, and for each g L Merlin needs to send h + 1 coefficients to define g L . Thus, overall the time is about hv d . For the key property of the consistency test to hold, we need to set v ≈ m δ ≈ h δ (this comes from the bound we have on the set Z, which in turn comes from the initial amplification of the AM protocol we are derandomizing). Overall the running time is about h δd . Specifying the polynomial p explicitly requires roughly h d coefficients, and thus the protocol achieves something nontrivial since it runs in time that is only some constant root of h d .
5.1.2.
Goal: Achieve the low end. The parameters achieved by the construction outlined above correspond to the "high end" of hardness assumptions. When using this construction in the framework of [15] , we will be given an E-complete language and will set f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} as the characteristic function of this language (restricted to inputs of length ). When given such a Boolean function f over bits we encode it as a d = O(1) variate polynomial p (the low-degree extension of f ) with h, m ≈ 2 /d . We get that if we obtain a co-nondeterministic circuit D that rejects all outputs of the generator, then p (and therefore f and the complete language) have commit-and-evaluate protocols that conform resiliently with p, and, as described in section 4, these can be transformed into AM protocols that compute p.
The overall protocol then gives us exactly the kind of parameters one wants; i.e., it runs in time polynomial in the output length, m, of the generator. However, this relationship is achieved only at the "high end," that is, when m = 2 Ω( ) , and in fact the construction fails completely when m becomes significantly smaller. Our goal is to achieve the "low end," so we must modify the construction of the generator so that we get a running time of poly(m) for any m, ideally all the way down to m = poly( ).
5.1.3.
Reducing the degree h and distinguishing between r, d. A very natural idea (that has been useful in previous works in this area, e.g., [32, 30] ) is to encode the function f using a polynomial p with more than a constant number of variables. This will enable the encoding to use smaller degrees. Note, however, that because the number of variables increases when the degree decreases, the running time of the protocol we just described does not benefit from reducing the degree h, as the gain over the trivial protocol depends only on δ, which cannot be smaller than a constant. Thus, at this point it is not clear what we can gain from reducing the degree.
We will attempt to circumvent this problem by achieving the "best of both worlds," which is having a small degree while keeping the number of variables a constant. To achieve a behavior with that flavor we distinguish between two parameters r (the number of variables) and d (the number of "grouped variables"). More precisely, we now encode the function f as a polynomial p : F r → F for superconstant r (at the absolute low end we will use r as large as / log , which allows the degree to go down to h = poly( )). While doing so we keep d as a constant and identify We can now run the original MV generator just as before by thinking of p as a function p : B d → F. This follows from our observation that we need only the restriction of p to the axis-parallel lines to form an error-correcting code, and here for every axis-parallel line L in B d , the restriction of p to L (which is a function from F r/d to F) is a Reed-Muller codeword. In the commit-and-evaluate protocol for p that we already discussed, we need only to alter one thing to accommodate the grouped variables: when sending the functions g L , Merlin will need to supply coefficients for p restricted to L which is now a degree h polynomial in r/d variables and has about h r/d coefficients (as compared to h coefficients previously). At first glance it may seem that we have made progress and can handle m much smaller than the original MV construction required, but this is not the case. For the restrictions of p to the axis-parallel lines in B d to form a code (which is needed for the key property of the consistency test), the HSG must output m > h r/d evaluations, and thus overall we do not gain (we were hoping to take m only slightly larger than h and not h r/d ). However, we did make some progress, as various quantities in the protocol (such as the number of evaluations Merlin must supply in the commitment phase and the length of the "path" computed for each evaluation) depend on d (which is constant) rather than on r. pass the new probabilistic test with reasonable probability. This will be sufficient to maintain the resiliency of the protocol. However, our goal was to reduce m and have the protocol run in time poly(m). But even invoking the extractor once for the probabilistic small-set test takes time linear in its input length h r/d , which is much larger than m. The crucial realization at this point is that we are only ever interested in running the extractor on input strings that are evaluations of low-degree polynomials! We can thus replace E with a local extractor for the Reed-Muller code and consequently reduce the running time of the extractor to poly(m) when given oracle access to its input.
Reducing m by using local extractors for
So, we can perform the small-set test in time poly(m) given oracle access to the various g L sent by Merlin. For our choice of parameters, the consistency test will also run in time poly(m) given oracle access to the g L . However, one hurdle remains: the step in which Merlin sends the coefficients of the polynomials g L still requires h r/d m time to send the h r/d coefficients of g L , while we are shooting for poly(m) time.
Sending the polynomials g L implicitly.
Let us assume at this point that for some reason we already knew that for every axis-parallel line L in B d , the polynomial p restricted to L has a commit-and-evaluate protocol that conforms with it resiliently and that this protocol runs in time poly(m). Then, instead of having Merlin send the polynomial g L (which is supposed to be p restricted to L) explicitly, Arthur and Merlin could play the commitment phase of the protocol for g L , after which Merlin will be able to assist Arthur in evaluating g L on any input that Arthur wishes.
However, we have now exposed the protocol to the possibility that Merlin may cheat by committing to a function that is not a low-degree polynomial, and then (at least) two things break: the local extractor for Reed-Muller codes may be run with access to an oracle that is not a Reed-Muller codeword, destroying the extractor property needed for the integrity of the small-set test; and, the key property of the consistency test may fail, as it relies on all of the received functions being codewords.
The solution is to run a low-degree test on each function Merlin commits to, verifying that it is indeed a low-degree polynomial. This test can be done locally, with oracle access to the function, and the fact that Merlin is committed to a function (and cannot alter the requested evaluations upon seeing the randomness of the test) ensures the validity of the test.
Let us summarize our current position. If we knew that for every axis-parallel line L in B d the polynomial p restricted to L had a poly(m) time commit-and-evaluate protocol that conformed with it resiliently, then we would be able to produce a commitand-evaluate protocol that conforms with p resiliently and, more importantly, runs in time poly(m) (which is our goal).
Using recursion to obtain commit-and-evaluate protocols
To give us the commit-and-evaluate protocol on the restrictions of p to axisparallel lines L in B d , needed in the recursive step, we modify the construction of the original HSG, finally arriving at the construction in Figure 1 . In this construction, in addition to the original output of our modified MV generator run on p, we also output all the outputs of our modified MV generator run on the polynomials p restricted to each axis-parallel line L in B d and continue with this recursively. The inputs to the recursive calls are sufficiently smaller than the original input so that we do not increase the set of outputs of the generator by more than a polynomial factor. Now, a circuit D that rejects all the outputs of our generator can be used as advice to play the protocol on all the polynomials g L that we will ever be interested in at any level of the recursion.
Whenever the final commit-and-evaluate protocol needs to access some restriction of p to a line L, it will invoke the protocol now available for that restriction, continuing this recursively down to the base case.
We stress that the resiliency property of the commit-and-evaluate protocols plays a crucial role inside the recursion (in addition to its role as described in section 4). Specifically, the resiliency property of the protocol for g L says that following the commitment phase, Merlin is committed to some function, and this is what prevents Merlin from cheating when doing the local tests (such as the low-degree test). If it were not for resiliency, then Merlin would be able to choose outputs for g L after seeing the queries of the low-degree test, which would make the test useless.
Losses suffered in the recursion.
While we can reduce m using the ideas outlined above, there are also some costs to using this recursive argument. First, each recursive step in the protocol picks up two additional rounds, and thus we end up with a protocol with 2 log d r rounds. Such protocols can be transformed into two round protocols, but the running time suffers a blowup which is slightly superpolynomial. The running time also suffers as each recursive step multiplies the running time of the protocol by poly(m). When taking these two factors into consideration and transforming to a two round AM protocol, we get that this protocol has running time m 1) . This accounts for the slight nonoptimality of our main gap theorems.
The construction.
We now give the full recursive HSG construction, which uses the following definition. Recall that F is the field with q elements. 
is also a polynomial with degree bounded by that of p. We present our construction in Figure 1 . 
Miltersen-Vinodchandran consistency test.
We abstract a certain part of the original Miltersen-Vinodchandran (MV) proof [27] and prove conformity and resiliency for it. This primitive, together with the three primitives in sections 3.2 and 3.3, will be the main ingredients in the reduction, proving correctness of the new generator. The main point of the abstraction is that the consistency test makes sense when the "lines" of the original MV construction are replaced by what we are calling "MV lines," which are more general. We need one definition first. {(x 1 , . . . , x i , s i+1 , 
Definition 24 (MV paths and S-boxes). Given x ∈ B d and a set S ⊆ B, we define a sequence of d sets T 1 , . . . , T d called the MV path to x using S. Each of these sets contains MV lines as follows: T i contains all MV lines through points
(ii) (agreement at intersection points) For all i = 2, 3, . . . , d, for every pair of lines 
Proof. Since all of the functions p L and the S-box a agree with a single, underlying function p, it is clear that these inputs pass the MV consistency test. The second item follows from the definition of T d .
Lemma 26 (resilience of MV consistency test). Let Z be a set of at most K functions where each one is a function from B to F, and assume that for any two functions g
1 , g 2 ∈ Z, with g 1 = g 2 , Pr z∈B [g 1 (z) = g 2 (z)] ≤ β.
Then with probability at least γ over the choice of a random subset S ⊆ B with
|S| ≥ (2 log K + log(1/(1 − γ)))/ log(1/β)
the following event holds: for every S-box a : S d → F and for every x, there is at most one collection of functions from Z that passes the MV consistency test.
Proof. Let us call a subset S ⊆ B of the specified size "good" if it separates the functions g ∈ Z; i.e., for all g 1 = g 2 , there is some s ∈ S for which g 1 (s) = g 2 (s). It is a standard calculation to see that the probability a randomly chosen S of the specified size is not "good" is at most K 2 β |S| , which is at most 1 − γ by our choice of |S|. Now fix an S-box a and some x. Let T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T d be the MV path to x using S. By the definition of "good," for each MV line L ∈ T 1 , there is at most one function
The crucial observation is that for each MV line L 2 ∈ T 2 , the union of the intersections of L 2 with the MV lines in T 1 is exactly L 2 (S). Therefore (again using the definition of "good"), for each L 2 ∈ T 2 , there is at most one function g L2 ∈ Z for which g L2 (s) agrees with the functions associated with lines in T 1 at all s ∈ S (since we already argued that these functions are unique if they exist at all).
In general, each MV line L i ∈ T i intersects the union of the MV lines in T i−1 at exactly L i (S). So, by the same argument, for each L i ∈ T i , there is at most one function g Li ∈ Z for which g Li (s) agrees with the functions associated with lines in
We conclude that if S is "good," then there is at most one collection of functions that passes the MV consistency test, as required.
The reduction.
Recall that the proof that a construction is indeed an HSG takes the form of a protocol for computing the hard function if the HSG fails. We will specify a commit-and-evaluate protocol π = (π commit , π eval ) that takes advice α = D (where D is a co-nondeterministic circuit) and attempts to compute the polynomial p. We will prove that whenever D catches the generator RMV h,d (p), then the protocol π conforms with p resiliently. (Note that this does not mean that π computes p. However, in our application we will be able to use π to construct a protocol that does compute p.) Our main theorem is stated below. In fact, following [15] , we prove a slightly stronger statement in which the resiliency of the protocol follows regardless of whether D catches RMV h,d (p) as long as D rejects few inputs. This will be useful later on. Moreover, π eval has completeness 1, and π commit is a two round protocol. The rest of section 6 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 27. Our main results (Theorems 6 and 7) then follow from Theorem 27 largely using machinery already worked out in [15] . Figure 3 we formally present the protocol σ used to prove Theorem 27, incorporating the ideas discussed in section 5.1. Our main lemma regarding this protocol is the following. Figure 1 . Our protocol is paired with the construction in Figure 1 and uses the parameters of that construction.
The recursive commit-and-evaluate protocol. In
Lemma 28 (correctness of σ). Let d, h, r, m, q be as in
Ingredients:
The protocol relies on commit-and-evaluate protocol τ such that for every MV line L, τ with advice (D, L) conforms resiliently with the function p L . In the final proof, this protocol will exist by recursion. Operation of the commit phase σ commit :
• The input is 1 log |F r q | and the auxiliary input is the co-nondeterministic circuit D.
• Arthur sends a random set S ⊆ B of size v = k 2 .
• Merlin replies with an S-box a : S d → F.
• Arthur outputs (S, a, D) . Operation of the evaluation phase σ eval :
• The input is x ∈ B d (= F r q ), and the auxiliary input is the output of the commit phase.
• S-box a by  a(s 1 , . . . , s d ) = p(s 1 , . . . , s d ) . Merlin will send a in σ commit . We define a collection of polynomials g L = p L , one for each line L in the MV path to x using S. By Lemma 25 the MV consistency test passes with these choices. We now define a Merlin strategy for σ eval as follows: in the inner commitment step, Merlin will "play honestly" and use the strategy that guarantees that τ eval conforms with p L given the commitment c L generated in the commit phase. (Note that Merlin has such a strategy which succeeds with probability one by the conformity of τ .) Merlin can now pass the low-degree test by simply following the protocol (as p L is indeed a low-degree polynomial). For the small-set test, we notice that by assumption D rejects all elements of H p , and so D rejects E pL (y) for every MV line L and every seed y. Thus, Merlin can pass the small-set test. Finally, we observe using Lemma 25 that the output w when Merlin follows this strategy is indeed p(x), as required. Note that the strategy we described succeeds with completeness 1.
(Resiliency) We need to show that for a uniformly chosen set S ⊆ B of size v, with high probability, for every S-box a the protocol σ eval is PSV when played with auxiliary input (S, a, D) . The protocol σ eval invokes the commitment protocol τ commit once for every MV line on the MV path, and there are at most v d such MV lines. We now argue that by our requirement on the resiliency of τ we have that with probability greater than 99/100 over the coin tosses of Arthur in the invocations of τ commit , all commitments c L obtained in the inner commitment step have the property that τ eval with auxiliary input c L is PSV. To see that we note that τ commit is a two round protocol, and therefore with probability 1−2
−10v
d over Arthur's choice of coins, every reply of Merlin results in a commitment string on which τ eval is PSV. It follows by a union bound that with probability at least 99/100 all coin tosses of Arthur in the invocations of τ commit have the aforementioned property.
7 From now on we assume that this event happens and this allows us to think of τ L (the invocation of τ eval with auxiliary input c L ) as functions. Note that Merlin still has the liberty to play any strategy that he wants in the commitment phase of τ and thus has many different choices for what partial function to commit to. We will show that there is at most one choice that passes all tests.
We claim that if Arthur does not halt during the low-degree test step, then with probability larger than 99/100 (over Arthur's random choices for the low-degree test), every line L on the MV path is close to a polynomial g L of degree at most h, and the self-corrector M SC accesses this g L . The follows from a union bound and the fact that the error for the low-degree test is at most 2
We now define the set Z to be all polynomials g :
We use Proposition 16 to argue that |Z| ≤ 2 k = 2 h 5 . This follows by having the set D of Proposition 16 be the set of inputs on which co-nondeterministic circuit D rejects, and by noticing that |D|/2 m + ≤ 1/2 (where here = 1/k < 1/10 is the error of the extractor E).
We claim that if Arthur does not halt during the small-set test, then with probability larger than 99/100, for every L on the MV path, g L ∈ Z. This is because if g L ∈ Z, then the probability (over the choice of seeds for the extractor and randomness for the self-corrector) that the small-set test passes on L is at most 2
−5v
d , and by a union bound over all MV lines in the MV path we have that the probability that this event occurs for any L on the MV path is less than 1/100.
Finally, we claim that if Arthur does not halt during the MV consistency test, then by Lemma 26 there is at most one choice for a collection of functions from Z that pass the MV consistency test. To use the lemma we must check that v = |S| is large enough compared to K = 2 k , which is the bound we have on the size of Z. Indeed, taking γ = 99/100 and β = 1/10, we have that
as required. We conclude that any Merlin strategy on which Arthur does not halt and output ⊥ with probability at least 9/10 must end up defining this unique collection of functions g L . In particular, there is at most one choice for the function g L for the single MV line L ∈ T d , and as this function defines the output uniquely, there is at most one possible value that Arthur can output, and the protocol is resilient with probability 9/10 and soundness 1/10. 
. We now turn our attention to the number of rounds. The number of rounds of protocol σ eval is precisely the number of rounds of τ . This is because to actually execute σ eval , Arthur picks all the randomness for the various low-degree tests and the randomness to run the self-corrector on the evaluations required for all the other tests. Then Arthur and Merlin play all the requested invocations of τ L (z) for the various lines L and evaluation points z, in parallel. Merlin includes witnesses for the various small-set tests in his final message to Arthur.
Finally, we note that σ commit has two rounds, and therefore the total number of rounds of σ is the number of rounds of τ plus two, as required.
Proof of the main technical theorem.
We now show that Theorem 27 follows from Lemma 28.
Proof of Theorem 27. Let D be a co-nondeterministic circuit. Recall that we allow only polynomials p : F r → F with r = d j , where j ≥ 1 is an integer. We prove the theorem by induction on j.
(Base case). We start with the base case j = 1. In this case the output of RMV h,d (p) is simply H p . For the base case to follow from Lemma 28 we need only to supply a commit-and-evaluate protocol τ meeting the requirements in Figure 3 . We use the trivial protocol in which Merlin sends to Arthur a polynomial (by specifying all coefficients) that is supposed to be p L . More formally, in the commit protocol τ commit Arthur sends nothing and Merlin replies with a string a that encodes a polynomial g L : F → F (the honest Merlin will send p L ). In the evaluation protocol τ eval Arthur can evaluate g L on an input by himself without the help of Merlin. It is immediate that this protocol τ eval meets the requirements of Figure 3 and the assumptions of Lemma 28, and therefore the base case follows. Note that τ is a two round protocol (actually it is a nondeterministic protocol rather than an AM protocol as Arthur does not send any random messages). Furthermore, note that τ runs in time poly(h).
Induction step. Let j > 1. We assume by induction that we already have a commit-and-evaluate protocol τ = (τ commit , τ eval ) that meets the requirements of Theorem 27 for every p over r = d j−1 variables. Furthermore, we assume by induction that τ has completeness 1 and that τ commit is a two round protocol. We observe that such a protocol meets the requirements of Figure 3 as well as the requirements of Lemma 28. This follows because we can amplify soundness and resiliency errors to the level required in Lemma 28 with slowdown
Furthermore, for the conformity part we observe that since D rejects every element of RMV h,d (p), it in particular rejects every element in H p . Thus, the induction step follows from Lemma 28. Any recursive level multiplies the running time by a factor of h O(d) and adds two rounds. There are log d r such recursion levels, and the theorem follows.
Obtaining our main results.
In this section we show how our main results (Theorems 6, 7, and 8) follow from Theorem 27. The argument for this part is essentially the argument in [15] except that now we use the new generator RMV (Figure 1 ) rather than the generator of [27] . We give a high-level overview of the argument in the next subsection. For completeness we also provide a full formal proof that appears in the remainder of this section.
High-level overview of the argument.
In this subsection we give a high-level overview of how to obtain our main theorems. We start with Theorem 6. Let f be the characteristic function of a language complete for E that is instancecheckable (via Theorem 21). We are given a function s = s( ). Fix and set m = s( )
2 ) . Consider a language L in AM and let σ be a (standard, two round) AM protocol for L with perfect completeness (without loss of generality [12] ). We will design a nondeterministic machine M running in time exponential in and show that if, for each , M does not agree with L on an m-bit string x produced by a uniform nondeterministic procedure R ("the derandomization fails on feasibly generated inputs"), then f can be computed by an AM protocol running in time s( ). We start by defining the machine M , which uses the generator RMV from Figure 1. 7.1.1. The generator and the derandomization. Set h = m 100 , q = h 100 , and set d to be a large constant and r = O( / log h). It is standard that there is a polynomial p : F r → F (the low-degree extension [8] ) of total degree at most h over r = O( / log h) variables such that for every y ∈ {0, 1} , p(y) equals f (y). Furthermore, the coefficients of p can be computed in time 2
The nondeterministic machine M is defined as follows: for every string z ∈ H we simulate the protocol σ on x with z used as Arthur's randomness and guess an answer for Merlin. We accept if all of the simulated runs of the protocol accept. Note that M is indeed a nondeterministic machine that runs in time exponential in .
The reduction.
Assume that M disagrees with L on x. Because σ has perfect completeness, this can happen only when x ∈ L and yet M accepts x. Define the co-nondeterministic circuit D x (y) that rejects if, on input x, Merlin has a reply to Arthur's message y (in the AM protocol σ for L) that causes Arthur to accept. By the efficiency of protocol σ, D x has size poly(m), and by the soundness of protocol σ, we have that D x rejects at most a third of its inputs. Finally, since M accepted x, D x must reject every y ∈ H.
Note that we can now use the protocol π = (π commit , π eval ) of Theorem 27 with advice D x , and we get that π conforms with p resiliently and runs in time m
However, the protocol π only conforms resiliently with p and does not necessarily compute f , as discussed at the end of section 4.1.
Using instance checkers.
To solve this problem we will use instance checkers (in the same way they are used in [6, 33, 15] ). Recall that we chose a function f that has an instance checker. For an instance-checkable f , a "commit-andevaluate" protocol that conforms resiliently with f can be converted into a standard AM protocol for f . Proof.
[sketch] We describe the AM protocol π . Given input x, Arthur and Merlin execute the commitment protocol π commit . By the resiliency of π following this phase with high probability Merlin is committed to some (partial) function g (which may be different from f ). Arthur chooses randomness for the instance checker and sends it to Merlin. The two parties then simulate the instance checker on input x where oracle calls are simulated by playing the evaluation protocol π eval . Arthur outputs the recommendation of the instance checker regarding the value of f (x). The theorem follows immediately from the properties of instance checkers.
We conclude that there is an AM protocol that computes f in time m O(log r) and uses O(log r) rounds (recall that d is a constant). This protocol can be transformed into a two round protocol running in time m O(log 2 r) , and the parameters are set so that the time is at most s( ) as required. Thus, we obtain a two round AM protocol that computes an E-complete problem in time s( ).
7.1.4.
The case of AM ∩ coAM. We now explain the idea for Theorem 7. A natural idea for removing the restriction to feasibly generated inputs is to have Merlin supply the input x (rather than having it supplied by some external uniform procedure R). The only part of the above argument that might fail is that we can no longer be sure that D x rejects at most 1/3 of its inputs, and then the resiliency of the protocol π is not guaranteed. However, if Arthur can verify that x ∈ L, then the corresponding circuit D x must reject at most 1/3 of its inputs, and the resiliency of π follows. In general, Arthur has no way to check that x ∈ L, but when L ∈ AM∩coAM, Merlin can convince Arthur that x ∈ L.
In the next three subsections we give the precise details for the argument outlined in section 7.1.
Nondeterministic simulation of AM protocols.
We start with describing how to use an HSG against co-nondeterministic circuits to perform nondeterministic simulation of AM protocols. This is standard, but we go through it in order to set parameters for the next part. The first observation is that given an AM language L and an input x, the behavior of the AM protocol on x can be captured by a co-nondeterministic circuit D x which receives the random coin tosses of Arthur as input.
Lemma 30. For any language L ∈ AM there is a constant c > 0 such that for any input x ∈ {0, 1} n there is a co-nondeterministic circuit D x of size m = n c such that the following hold:
Proof. By [12] we can assume that the AM protocol for L has perfect completeness. Consider the following deterministic circuit D x (y, a): simulate Arthur's computation with coin toss y and Merlin's response a and flip the final answer. This deterministic circuit can be interpreted as a co-nondeterministic circuit D x (y) that fulfills all the requirements above.
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When given a hard problem, we use the low-degree extension [8] to transform it into a low-degree polynomial as follows.
Lemma 31 (low-degree extension). The proof of Lemma 31 is standard (see, e.g., [34] ). To prove Theorems 6, 7, and 8, we need to construct a nondeterministic machine that attempts to simulate a given AM language L. To finish up the argument and prove our main theorems we show that, given an input x on which M L fails to simulate L correctly, we can give an AM protocol for the supposedly hard function f . This is done in the next subsection.
Establishing the correctness of the nondeterministic simulation.
We now suppose that the machine M L disagrees with the AM language L on some input x and show how the protocol π from Theorem 27 yields an AM protocol that computes the function f on all inputs of a particular length that is a function of the 9 It is indeed more natural to think of Dx as a nondeterministic circuit (without flipping the answer). The reason we speak about a co-nondeterministic circuit is that the definition of hitting set generators is not symmetric in zeros and ones, and in order to meet this definition we need to flip the output. In this choice we follow [27, 15] .
Our procedure uses the construction and parameters of Figure 1 .
Ingredients:
(i) An AM language L. This is the language to be derandomized.
(ii) A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. This is the "hard function" supplied to the derandomization procedure.
( • Let c be the constant guaranteed by Lemma 30 for L and set m = n c .
• Compute the smallest integer such that s( ) c /(log v( )−log log s( )) 2 ≥ m. Since s is time-constructible, this can be found efficiently by binary search. Note that this is exactly the relationship between s, , m, and n that we need to fulfill in our main theorems. We can assume without loss of generality that
• Set h to be the smallest prime power larger than m 100 and q = h 100 . Let p be the low-degree extension of f at length v( ) over the field with q elements. We have that p : F r → F is a polynomial with r = O(v( )/ log h) variables over a field of size q.
, which is a multiset of m bit strings.
• For every string z ∈ H guess a witness showing that Dx(z) rejects. Recall that Dx is a co-nondeterministic circuit, so it has short witnesses for rejection.
• Finally, accept x if and only if for every z ∈ H the guessed witness proves that Dx(z) rejects. length of x. We will use the fact that problems complete for E or EXP have instance checkers. In Figure 5 we present the AM protocol τ for computing the function f in the event that M L fails to decide L. Our main theorem of this subsection asserts that protocol τ indeed computes f on all inputs of a particular length when supplied with an advice string x on which M L disagrees with the language L. In fact, we will prove a stronger statement in which the soundness of τ holds under the weaker condition that x ∈ L. (This is indeed a weaker condition by Lemma 32.) This stronger statement will be helpful later when proving Theorems 7 and 8. (ii) The commit-and-evaluate protocol π = (π commit , π eval ) that is guaranteed in Theorem 27 when using the polynomial p as defined in the construction of the machine M L using the parameters d, h, r, m, q defined there. Recall that p is the low-degree extension of f at length v( ) and that protocol π expects as advice a conondeterministic circuit of size poly(m). Input: A string y of length . The protocol is trying to compute f (y). Auxiliary input: A string x of length n. Operation:
• Arthur computes the circuit Dx defined in Lemma 30.
• Arthur and Merlin play the commit phase π commit using advice string Dx and they obtain as output a commitment com. • Arthur chooses random coin tosses for the instance checker IC when run on input y and sends them to Merlin.
• Merlin simulates the run of IC on y using oracle f . Merlin sends the transcript of this simulation to Arthur, and for all queries y of length v( ) made to f , Arthur and Merlin play the protocol π eval on the input y (in parallel). Arthur verifies that the output he obtains is consistent with the answer to the query provided by Merlin on y in the transcript that Merlin sent. Arthur also verifies that the transcript is indeed valid when using the supplied oracle queries and answers. Arthur outputs ⊥ and halts if he detects any inconsistency.
• Arthur outputs the output of IC(y) that appears in the transcript. Arthur is such that π eval with auxiliary input com conforms with p with completeness 1. Thus, by simulating the instance checker IC correctly, Merlin can lead Arthur to output f (y) as he can convince Arthur that the transcript of the instance checker is correct.
(Soundness) By Lemma 30 if x ∈ L, then D x rejects at most a 1/3-fraction of its inputs. By Theorem 27 we have that in this case π is resilient. It follows that no matter how Merlin plays in the commit phase π commit , the output com is such that π eval with auxiliary input com is PSV. It follows that there exists a function g : {0, 1} v( ) → {0, 1} such that for any input y to π eval , no matter how Merlin plays, he cannot lead Arthur to accept a value different than g(y ) with noticeable probability. In such a case (assuming π is sufficiently amplified using Proposition 19) we have that no instantiation of π eval in the protocol τ answers incorrectly. By the properties of instance checkers we have that when IC(y) is run with oracle access to g, then with high probability (over the randomness for IC supplied by Arthur) the output is either f (y) or ⊥. It follows that if Merlin is able to complete the execution of τ , then with high probability Arthur outputs f (y). Thus, the probability that Merlin can make Arthur output a value different than f (y) is smaller than the default soundness error of 1/3. 
Putting everything together.
We are finally ready to prove Theorems 6, 7, and 8. The setup and parameter choice for the three theorems is very similar, so we will start by describing the common part of the three proofs.
The setup and parameters. Let s( ) be an integer function satisfying the requirements of Theorems 6, 7, and 8. Let L be a language in AM. Let f be a characteristic function of a problem in E (resp., EXP) that has an instance checker IC that makes queries of length v( ) = O( ) (resp., v( ) = O (1) ). Note that the existence of such a function f is guaranteed by Theorem 21. Let M L be the nondeterministic machine defined in Figure 4 . We first verify that the relationships among the parameters n, , and s( ) are exactly as specified in the theorems.
Recall that M L receives inputs of length n, and the description of M L fixes the parameter m = n c (where c is a constant that depends only on the AM language L). Also recall that M L chooses as a function of m. More precisely, we choose to be the smallest integer such that s( ) on inputs of length n. Thus, our choice of parameters is as promised in Theorems 6, 7, and 8.
In the proofs of the three theorems, we need to show that if M L fails to decide L (where the meaning of this statement differs in the different theorems), then there is an AM protocol that computes f and runs in time s( ). Let τ be the ArthurMerlin protocol defined in Figure 5 . The high-level idea is that by Theorem 33 we are guaranteed that τ indeed computes f when it is given an auxiliary input x on which L and L(M L ) disagree. The difference between the three proofs is in how this string x is obtained. Before going into this issue, let us first observe that the running time of τ is indeed smaller than s( ) for our choice of parameters.
By Theorem 33 protocol τ runs in time m O(log v( )−log log m) and has O(log v( ) − log log m) rounds. Given an Arthur-Merlin protocol that runs in time T and has R rounds, it is possible to collapse it into a two round protocol that runs in time T O(R) [7] . Thus we can get a two round protocol with running time to m O(log v( )−log log m) 2 
.
Recall that in the definition of M L we chose to be the smallest integer such that where we are using the fact that (log v( ) − log log m) = O(log v( ) − log log s( )), which follows because by the definition of m (log v( ) − log log m) = (log v( ) − log log s( )) + 2 log (log v( ) − log log s( )) + O (1) ≤ (1 + o(1))(log v( ) − log log s( )) + O(1).
We observe that the O(1) in the exponent on s( ) in (7.1) (which depends on c , c, and the hidden constants in Lemma 31 and Theorem 21) can be made to be any positive constant by choosing c to be a sufficiently small constant. We now split the proof into the cases of the three different theorems. We begin with the proof of Theorem 6. In this case there is an external machine R (the refuter) that supplies the auxiliary input x.
Proof of Theorem 6. Assume that M L fails on feasibly generated inputs, and let R be a nondeterministic machine as in Definition 4. We are guaranteed that for all but finitely many input lengths n and for every accepting computation path, R(1 n ) outputs a string x of length n such that L and L(M L ) disagree on x. We will show that f has a two round Arthur-Merlin protocol running in time s( ) that computes f on inputs of length . This will prove Theorem 6.
Consider the following Arthur-Merlin protocol: When given input y ∈ {0, 1} , Arthur and Merlin compute an integer n so that is the integer chosen by the nondeterministic machine M L when given inputs x of length n. Merlin then sends a string x of length n with an accepting computation path of R(1 n ) that outputs x. The two parties then run the protocol τ on input y and auxiliary input x.
By the properties of the refuter R we have that L and L(M L ) disagree on x. By Lemma 32 we have that x ∈ L. By Theorem 33 this gives us the completeness and soundness properties of protocol τ with auxiliary input x. We conclude that the protocol above computes f on all but finitely many input lengths .
The running time of the Arthur-Merlin protocol above is dominated by the running time of τ which is bounded by s( ) 1/100 . Thus, the entire protocol runs in time smaller than s( ), as required.
In the case of Theorems 6 and 7, we have additionally that L is in coAM. When given y ∈ {0, 1} , we will now rely entirely on Merlin to send a string x of length n that will be used as auxiliary input for the protocol τ . Unlike the case of Theorem 6, we do not have the refuter to ensure that Merlin indeed sends an x ∈ L. We will therefore ask Merlin to also prove to Arthur that x ∈ L, which Merlin can do in this case because L is in coAM.
Proof of Theorem 7. We assume that L is also in coAM. We will show that if L and L(M L ) disagree for all but finitely many input lengths n, then f has a two round Arthur-Merlin protocol running in time s( ) that computes f . This will prove Theorem 7.
Consider the following Arthur-Merlin protocol: When given input y ∈ {0, 1} , Arthur and Merlin compute an integer n so that is the integer chosen by the nondeterministic machine M when given inputs x of length n. Merlin sends a string x of length n (that is supposed to be a string on which L and L(M L ) disagree). Arthur and Merlin then play the AM protocol for the complement of L on the input x (note that such a protocol exists as we are assuming that L ∈ coAM and we can assume without loss of generality that it has perfect completeness). By the completeness and soundness of this protocol, at the end of this protocol Arthur is convinced with high probability that x ∈ L. At this point Arthur and Merlin play protocol τ on input y using auxiliary input x.
An honest Merlin can indeed follow the protocol described above, and using Theorem 33 it follows that Arthur will output f (y) with probability one in this case. Furthermore, no matter how Merlin plays, Arthur will reject (with high probability) unless Merlin sends x ∈ L, in which case the soundness of the protocol follows by Theorem 33.
The running time of this protocol is dominated by the running time of τ . Thus, the protocol can be collapsed into a two round protocol that runs in time s( ) as required.
For Theorem 8 we are interested in the case that M L fails only on infinitely many input lengths n. In this case we would like the protocol for f to succeed on infinitely many input lengths . However, there is a subtle point here. In both protocols above we instructed Arthur and Merlin to compute n as a function of . Note, however, that there are many lengths n which satisfy the relationship "n is an integer so that is the integer chosen by the nondeterministic machine M L when given inputs x of length n." We were not concerned with this previously because all lengths n were good for our purposes. However, now only infinitely many lengths n are good. For this approach to work, we need that, for any length such that there is a good length n that satisfies the relation above, we can actually come up with such a length n.
We do not know how to do this in the setup of Theorem 6 (i.e., when the refuter succeeds only on infinitely many input lengths). However, we can do it in the setup of Theorem 7. We will now rely on Merlin to send such a length n. The soundness of the protocol for f still follows using Theorem 33 as Merlin still has to send an x that is not in L. However, the completeness is no longer guaranteed on all lengths as it is not necessarily the case that Merlin can come up with an n and an x such that L and L(M L ) disagree on x. The formal proof appears below.
Proof of Theorem 8. We assume that L is also in coAM. We will show that if L and L(M L ) disagree on infinitely many input lengths n, then f has a two round ArthurMerlin protocol running in time s( ) such that on infinitely many input lengths the protocol computes f . This will prove Theorem 7. Note that there is no guarantee that there is a gap between completeness and soundness on "incorrect" lengths .
Consider the following Arthur-Merlin protocol: When given input y ∈ {0, 1} , Merlin sends an integer n and Arthur checks that is the integer chosen by the nondeterministic machine M L when given inputs x of length n. Merlin then sends a string x of length n (that is supposed to be a string on which L and L(M L ) disagree). From here on the proof is similar to that of Theorem 7; namely: Arthur and Merlin play the AM protocol for the complement of L on the input x. By the completeness and soundness of this protocol, at the end of the protocol Arthur is convinced with high probability that x ∈ L. At this point Arthur and Merlin play protocol τ on input y using advice x.
An honest Merlin can indeed follow the protocol described above (on infinitely many input lengths ), and using Theorem 33 it follows that Arthur will output f (y) with probability one in this case. Furthermore, no matter how Merlin plays, Arthur will reject (with high probability) unless Merlin sends x ∈ L, and the soundness of the protocol follows by Theorem 33. In fact, soundness is guaranteed on all lengths .
Again, the running time of this protocol is dominated by the running time of τ . Thus, the protocol can be collapsed into a two round protocol that runs in time s( ), as required.
Conclusions and open problems.
In this paper we give improved uniform hardness versus randomness tradeoffs for Arthur-Merlin games that come very close to the "absolute low end." A very natural open problem is to give a tradeoff that achieves the absolute low end, namely, one that achieves n = s( ) Ω(1) in Theorems 6, 7, and 8 rather than the current bound, which gives n = s( ) Θ(1/(log −log log s( ))
2 ) for E and n = s( ) Θ((1/ log )
